The problem of assessing the international impact of the Iranian revolution, whether in the fields of oil or geopolitical strategy, can be divided into two parts: first, the problem of identifying what the policies of the new govermnent are and the degree to which it is capable of putting them into practice; secondly, the problem of identifying \vhat the unintended or at least unofifcial consequences of the revolution have been, the shock waves and enthusiasms that such an event has generated elsewhere, and the counter-measures that its opponents are taking. In neither case it is yet possible to draw up more than a very preliminary balance-sheet. AH revolutions take time to evolve stable post-revolutinary governments capable of implementing consistent international policies In the Iranian case the degree of uncertainty at the centıe is, by the standards of tvventieth century revolutions, extreme.The factionalism, the instability ofpersonnel, the leisurely approach to forming a new permanent government, the very insecurity of the regime itself and its vulnerability to pressures, make any assessment of its foreign policy and oil policy more than usuaily difficult. This laclc of certainty applies even more to the second set of consequences, for here it is almost impossible, as yet, to grasp what the effects of the Shah's fail have been. In the stıictest terms, the results have as yet been rather small, and far smaller than initial expectations, hopeful or alarmed, were neither the politicssof any neighbouring state, nor the balance of east-west relations, nor the international oil economy have been seriously affected by the changes in Iran. Whilst the revolution promoted a steep price rise, the market has now accomodated to the loss of Iranian crude supplies. The main effects have been those of diffuse panic and a net subtraction from international arrangements, economic and strategic alike. But even in the more orderly of revolutions it may take many years for the international consequences to play themselvcs out, and such reverhatioııs may iııdced peısist as long as there are social systems of a contradictory kind in existence. Such slow, but longterm, effects can be seen in the cases of the Russian, Chinese and Cuban revolutions. They are also evident in the case of the Egyptian revolution which, vvhatever its legacy to-day, contiııued to effect the politics of the Arab world for ciose on two decades: iııdeed it was only seventeen years after July 1952 that the revolııtionary effects of Egypt found a successful echo in the monarchy that had for slong survived along its western frontier. The longer-run effects of the Iranian revolution can tlıe-refore only be a matter of speculation, of the evaluation of various scenarios under which the events in Iran have a regional and international effect. What follows is a discussion of both the official and unofficial consequences of the Iranian revolution as they appear to date, fiıst in the field of oil, and sccondly in the field of international relations.
A New Economic Policy?
When the post -revolutionary ıegime corne to power in Febrııary 1979 much of the Iranian economy, including the oil fields, \vas at a standstill. Many of the problems inherited from the Snah's period have continued, and nevv ones lıave arise ııas a result of the uncertainties of the republican period. In this context some at least of the changes in oil policy reflcct not so much deli'oerate choices by the nevv government, as the unavcidable effects of the revolution and its conseauences. The oil ministry has, like others,been the object of factional disputes and its first minister, Hassan Nazih . has fled into exile. The i,200 foreign technicians vvorking in the industry have ieft the country, and up to 700 Iranians have been dismissed from the Ministry in Tehran. The fields themselves have been affected both by sabotage and by industrial protests. Yet overall the nevv oil policy has reflected the choices of the nevv Iranian leadership and the ideas they have brought to bear.
Perhaps the clearest exposition of these nevv economic ideas is to be found in the vvritings of Bani-Sadr. Hiscentral argument has been that Iran's oil output has been conditioned by factors external to Iran itself: by the demands of the developed countries, who both wish to acquire cheap oil in substaııtial quantities and then to seli large quantitites of goods to Iran, many of which aıe unnecessary consumer goods. His remedy is one familiar from other third worl and oil producing countries: lower oil output, increase the price, resti ict foıeign import, and build up the productive capacities of the Iranian ecoııomy itself. At the same time he has advocated what he calls a 'unitary economics', a version of islamic welfare economics, under which the wealth of the country woııld be more evenly distributed. Iıı insisting upon conservatiou, the ı.evv Iranian authorities have followed the example of other oil producers, from Kuwait to Venezuela, who have also tried to determine output levels by their own needs.
Th, results of this policy in the first -post revolutionary months have been evident enough. 2. Price rises following the revolution. have somewhat offset the loss of output and inflation so that whereas the pre-rcvolutionary output earned över $ 20 biliions, the post-revolutionary figüre, one -seventh in size, earns income estimated at $ 13 biliions in 1980 -81 (MEED 22 August 1980 . 3. Following the revolution, Iran broke its sales and service agreement vvith the consortium and has since sold oil on short-term contracts to a wide ranğe of companies, as well as offloading up to 100,000 barrels a day on the spot market. Iran has, partly by design and partly by intention, also directed its oil exports away from its previous main partners in the developed industrial world and tovvards smaller developed countries, eastern European states and the third wcrld: such countries as India, South Korea, Spain, Brazil and Rumania occupy a more prominent place in the purchase pattern. The displacement of the old main purchasers reflects more than commercial choice by Iıan hovvever, since some companies have refused to pay the high prices Iran has asked for and have to some extent abstained from purchases in 1980 at the request of the USA.
In its general outlines, the new economic policy being pursued by the Iranian authorities is desigııed to reduce the reliance upon oil which the previous regime had brought about, and to determine Iran's oil revenues by the long-run anbsorptive capacities of the economy. Once again, a third vvorld oil-producing country has shown that it is capable of managing its oil output and marketing it, without the direct assistance of the majör companies. On closer examination, indeed, the economic consequences of the Iranian revolution have not ali been ııegative and in some areas progress has occurred.
i . Within the oil industry itself there has been an increase if refı'ning capacity as the refineries at Abadan and Rey have been run to almost full capacity, and the new refinery at Isfahan has come into operation. About 1 m.b.d. aıe now being refined 97,000 b.d. more than in 1978. Iran not only novv meets much of its own demand for refined products, but exports up to 200,000 b.d. of refined products, mainly fuel oil.
2. In its dealings with foreign companies, Iranian oil officials have shown considerable ingenuity in negociation. They have been able to seli some high-priced spot crude to companies as a form of "key money" for longer-term contracts and have been able to obtain from companies up to 70 % of the profil vvhich companies make from processing Iranian crude in other countries.
3. As a result of the fail in. oil revenues and the general reducticn of consumption levels, there has been a realignment of Iran's foreign trade: imports have fallen from $ 14,423 millions n 1977-1978 to $ 9,717 millions ın 1979-80. whilst non-oil exports, long neglected under the Shah, have risen from S 643 millions to $ 788 millions över the same period. Given that cil is a vvasting asset, the ratio of imports to non-exports is an important index of the longer-run strength of the economy.
4. Whlist the urban economy has slunıped, t here has been a substantial boom in agriculture. Ceıeal output in 1979-80 rose from 2.5 million tons to 4 millions, and even if one does not accept Bani-Sadr's claiın that Iran has become self-sufficient in this year for the first time in thirty years ali the indices, fragmen ted as they are, point to an upsuıge in agricultural output. Three main faetors account for this: first, the liftiıig of price coııtrols on agricultural produce has encouraged farmers to bocst their output; secondly , the difficulties of the urban economy have encouraged a return of some laboıır to the vıilages; thirdly, in the winter of 1978-79, as the revolution was reaching its climax, Khomeiııi instructed the peasantry to plaııt their crops. İt is not clear what the causal relationship is between a fail in food imports and a rise in domestic output, but it would appear that the reduction in purchases from abroad has at least coincided vvith this agricultural expansion. Agricultrusal credit terms have also been ensed.
These positive developments could form part of a reorganisation of the Iranian economy so that it becomes less reliant on oil, and is able to rneet a greater percentage of its demand reqııirements from iııternal output. Hovvever, such positive treııds have, for the moment, been. overşhadovved by other tendeııcies vvhich east into auestion the validity of post-revolutionary economic poücy.
1 . Prior to the revolution Iran vvas engaged in a substantial programme of secondary recovery. i. e. sustaining the output of vvells by reinjectin gas into the vvells and this way exiract oil that vvould not othervvise reach the sıırface. This involved planned investments of $ 5-10 billions. No progress has been reported on this since the revolution, and by ali accounts this complicated seherne requires foreign teehnieal assistance. Failure to continue the programme is not hovvever a neutral option, since the vveils not treated in this way deterioriate and vvith vvater seeping and pressure reduetions the extra oil ccases to be availab-!e. The result could therefore be that, \vhilst Iran reduces its output to convserve oil, its neglect of secondary reserves produces a reduction in the avalilable output equal to or greater than the amount saved in the first instance. Even if there is an element of alarmism in some vvestern accounts of this problem, it vvould ap-pcar to be a serious challenge to Iran's new poücy, one that can only be resolved by negotiating new service agreements vvith foreign companies.
2. Iran's nevv export poücy, based on the spot market and shorter-term contracts, is suitable only to a situation of inteı-national oil shortages, Jt cannot vvork in a situation of oil surplus, especially vvhen other producers and the main consuming nations have a scarcely-concealed desire to inhibit Iran's foreign exchange earnings. The successes of 1979, vvhen Iranian crude vvas seliing at substantially higher prices than that of Gulf competitors, are net likely to be repeated , for this combinatioıı of commercial and poîitical reasons. Those hostile to the present Iranian government are presumably able to recall that the almost complete boycott of Iran's oil during the Mosadeq period played an important role in destabilising İran at that time, vvhen the economy vvas far less dependent on oil revenues than it has since become.
3. Iran's international policies, in oil and even more in regional poîitical terms, have caused disagreemeııts vvith its neighbours who are OTEC members. The possibilities of a concerted policy by OPEC are therefore reduced: this applies both to the matter of pricing policy and output levels, but also to such matters as the projected celebratioıı of OPEC's tvventieth anniversary in Baghdad this November. The success of OPEC as a body, and the success of individual oil / development strategies in each of the meınber countries, relies on the members retaining a common front, and the events subsequent to the Iranian revolution have made this OPEC unity appear more under threat than at any time since the organisations's establishment. At a ti-me vvhen more hardline vvestern commentators are talking openly of breaking OPEC apart, and vvhen an apparent surplus of oil exists, such disagreement amongst producers may vveaken any attempts at nevv development strategies.
4. The greatest vveakness in Iran's new policy is that the individual advances made in oil production or other spheres are offset by the lack of any stable institutional forms. There has been no executive unity at the centre, and most cf vvhat the nevv regime has proposed has remained at the verbal level. Far from leading to a redistribution of vvealth in the cities, the revolution has created massive unemployment in the urban sector, and has led to seriousinflation,estimated at betvveen 30 % and 50 % in mid 1980. The conflict vvith the USA has also led, according to government eeonomists, to further inflation of up to 20 % in the price of imported goods, because of the higher commissions vvhich middlemen have been charging. Whilst it is impossible to put a quantified figüre upon the costs ınvolved , ıt .s evident that Iran has vvasted billions of dollars of oil revenues in cancelled or interrupted projects , in the enforced idleness of much of its urban vvorkforce, and in the brain drain vvhich has taken a avvay so many of the educated. The reduetion in oil revenues has also led to a serious budgetary crisis, vvith the oil revenue reduced from an initially projected $ 25 billions for 1980-81 to only $ alO billions in the nevv May 1980 programme. If, as now appers, oil revenue vvill be somevvhat above this figurt, it stiil means that İran vvill lack the income to meet its current budgetary expenditures, let alone launch nevv development programmes. The government vvill be faced, at some point in the nıonths ahead, vvith the choice of drastic dismissals in the state employment sector, a course of action that vvill add to unemployment and discontent, or of printing more money to pay its bills and vvage needs, an option that vvill lead to further inflation. Iran stili retains substantial foreign exchange reserves, valued at around $15 billions in early 1979 and the $8-a billions reportedly blocked in the USA vvill at some point in the future be released. But these reserves are being run dovvn and it is unlikely that, at any point in the near future, Iran vvould find a vveleome on in the international money markets for any nevv borrovving requests. Whilst a degee of conservation may therefore be beneficial to Iran, a too drastic reduetion in oil output may preelude any revitalisation of the econoıny as a vvhole and therefore block that redistribution of income and that buildup of produetive capacity vvhich are the main aims of the Bani-Sadr economy strategy.
5. Underlying the economic difficulties of the nevv government has also been the adoption of a militantly 'anti-imperialist' approach to foreign relations -both in regard to such issues as the hostages, and in regard to foreign companies, as vvell as in dealings vvith other states in the region. Deep-roote as some of this feeling may be, it can be doubted hovv far it in practice 1977] I RA. NıAN REVOLUTTON 55 furthers that reorganisation of Iranian society that its protagonists most desire. Not ali foreign investment or for.ign trade or use of foreign technicians necessarily involves "dependence' or 'underdevelopment': the question is who controls the terms of such a relationship. Indeed a doggedly autarkic economic policy can have even more negative effects , especially where it possesses an industrial sector like the Iranian one, that has been constructed though a high level of integration into the world market. Much Iranian in.dustry impons is raw materials as well as machinery. Much Iranian economic thinking seems to be shaped by a questionab!e belief in the benefits of autarky, a belief reinforced by Iran's dealings vvith other states and the conflicts these have provoked. Whether such a level of confrontation benefits the Iranian people remains to be seen, especially as Iran's enemies may seek to aggravate its economic difficulties by blocking the import of such vital commodities as vvheat and parrafin.
The International Consequeııces: Beyond the Nixon Doctrine
The international military and alliance system into vvhich Iran vvas integrated prior to the revolution rested up an accoumulatıon of arrangements. One set dated from the mıd-1950s and in its updated form, the Central Treaty Organisation, involved Iran in military ties vvith the USA and Britain and vvith Turkey and Pakistan. It vvas primarily directed against the USSR, but also enabled the vvest to supply its regional allies vvith military support for purposes of internal political control. Despite the fact that friction vvith the USSR declined after the Shah's agreement vvith the Russians in 1962, follovving a tradeoff in the vvake of the Cuba missiles crisis, Iran remained an important part of the USA's global military posture. its armed forces vvere designed to play a limited, "tripvvire', role in any future war vvith Russia. But more importantly the USA acqııired in the 1970s a number of electronic listening posts along the Iranian-Soviet frontier vvhich vvere used for minotirng radio and air traffic inside the USSR and vvhich vvould have had at least a short-term use in the event of vvorld war. Follovving the 1962 agreement hovvever, and even more so follovving the British vvithdravval of most of its overt forces from the Gultf in the 1968-1971 period, Iran played a regicnal role as opponent of revolutionary and other insurrectionary forces. Under the terms of the Nixon Doctrine, announced in July 1969 as a means of legitirnating the US withdrawal from Indo-china, but applied in a positive sense to Iran, selected third world states were to play an increasing direct military role, with US political and logistical support.
The record of Iranian Nixon Doctrine activity was a mixed one. Despite the collapse of the Iranian armed forces as a bastion of the Shah during the revolution, it vvould be a mistake to underplay the military role which these forces did play in the previous decade. Successful counter-insurgency operations were carried out in the Dhofar province of Oman and in the Baluchistan province of Pakistan. Perhaps the laı gest scale operation was the confrontation vvith Iraqin which the Shah engaged from the late 1960 and until 1975, both ıısing Iranian forces directly and acting through manipulation of the Kurds. Even the USSR became concerned at one point, vvhen, in 1976, the Shah acquired an airborme surveillance capacity and air to-air missiles which were seen in Moscow as a violation of the 1962 agreement. On the other hand the system was afflicted vvith several majör problems. There remained enmity betvveen İran and Saudi Arabia, especially as the latter, although equal to Iran in financial power, was no match militarily. Indeed the Shah flaunted his miliraty superiority över the Arabs and although he abandoned the claim to Bahrain he provocatively asserted Iran's claim to dominate the Gulf. For this reason no permanent alliance system of Gulf security was ever created, with the Iraqis being the most outspoken critics of such a project, but the other Arab states sharing reservations. Even had Gulf Security System been in existence, it is doubtful it if could have done anything to save the Shah. Moreover, the Shah's attempts to reassert a traditional Iranian dominance över another neighbouring area Afghanistan backfired dramatically in 1978 vvhen leftvving forces seized power in response to an attempt by then President Daud and the Iranians to suppress them. The Shah's regional policies were therefore, despite their successes, already in difficulty on both Iran's eastern and western frontiers before the revolution itself.
The official policy of the nevv Iranian government has been in the main one of renunciation. Iran has withrdrawn from CEN-TO, and the organisation has now been vvoırnd up. It has concelled ali military agreements vvith the USA, and has abrogated, vvithout Soviet agreement, the 1921 treaty vvith the USSR. Iran has broken ali political and commercial ties vvith Israel, South Africa and, more recently, Chile . It claims that its policy is one of non-alignment, and those like President Bani-Sadr vvho claim some sympathy for Mosadeq have revived the latters' concept of "negative balance'. Whatever else, these policies have had significant international effects, because Iran has definitively ceased to play either of the tvvo roles allotted to it under the Shah's agreements vvith the USA. It is certainly not part of the vvestern alliance system directed against the USSR; and it is not in a position to play a counter-revolutionary role in the Middle East at the behest of Washington.
When it comes to the political impact of the Iranian revolution outside its frontiers, it is often hard to be certain vvhere the official and the unofficial start, especially since there is considerable dispute inside Iran about what is "official'. Radio broadcasts directed against Iraq obviously must enjoy some official support. The seizure of the American hostages vvas probably not agreed to by Khomeini prior to its taking place and vvas directed against the then government of Mehdi Bazargan: yet it become an act vvhich the subsequent official representatives supported and indeed became for a time the centrepiece of Tran's nevv foreign policy. Although many government officials, as vvell as Khomeini, make foreign policy statementson a variety of issues the effect of these is often minimal in terms of follovvup by state bodies. In the realm of these declarations and tendencies one is dealing vvith a vvorld vvhere the official and unofficial meld ,vvhere unofficial initiatives can inflected state policy, and vvhere apparently formal prounouncements remain unimplemented. In this, of course, foreign policy is rnerely follovving tbe pattern vvhich most domestic policy has also follovved in the post-revolutionary oeriod.
Four issues that have aıisen in sucy a way aıe Palestine, Afghanistan the fuit and the cali for an extension of Islamic revolution to neighbouring countries.
1. Palestine: ali Iıanian pclitical factions appear united in their support for the Palestinian resistance, and Iran has instal-led the PLO in the former Israeli embassy in Tehran. Whilst no details have been established, it would seem that Iran now provides some financial support to the PLO, and the Palestinians have felt that the Iranian revolution is a moral and poîitical boost to them, especially at a time vvhen their overall situation has been subject to increasing pressure. Iranian support has also seemed to have the added benefit that it has not involved the poîitical selection that support from the Arab countries has involved. Yet this support has been more circumscribed than many expected. Despite initial speculation about the Iranian revolution involving a net transfer of Iran's might from one side to the other, this has not happened. At least one Iranian foreign minister has stated that Iran vvill not fight in a future Aıab -Israeli vvar, and the Iranian armed forces aıe , in any case, a less substantial threat to Israel than they once might have been. Moreover, the intermuslim conflicts vvhich the Iıaııian revolution has led to , betvveen Iran and Iraq, and betvveen Shia and Palestinians in Lebaııon itself, have also vveakened vvhat vvas at first exptctcd to be a broader common front against Israel.
2. Iran's official positioıı on Afghanistan has been one of support for the rebels there, even before the Soviet intervention in December 1979. There are susbstantial numbers of Afghan refugees in eastern Iran, particularly around Mashad, and a number of Afghan rebel leaders have visited Khomeini. With a common frontier, and long historical ties, and vvith Persian being the language of most educated Afghans, the natural bonds betvveen the two populations should appear very strong. Here, if anyvvheıe, the international impact of the Iranian revolution should be seen -more so than in Iraq or Palestine. On closser examination, the degree of Iranian involvemeııt in Afghanistan has not been so great. Some arms and money have crossed the forntiers, but the main Afglıan rebel camps have been in Pakistan and the main financial, support has come from the Arab states, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, despite their geographical proximity and historial links, Iıan and Afghanistan are rather separate countries. The land along their frontiers is sparsely populated and in now vvay comparable to the populous AfghanPakistaıı frontier. Resentments betvveen the two peoples also run deep-the Iranians tending to regard Afghans vvith prejudiced eyes, the Afghans remembering Persian domination. In reli-gious terms there are also divisions, vvith 80% of the Afghan population being Sunnites for whom Khomeini has little appeal and whose mode of organisation is very different from that underlying the Iranian revolution. The Tajiks, or Persian-speakers, inside Afghanistan appear to have been somewhat less mobilised in the rebellion than the Pushtuns of the south-east, amongst whom anti-Persian resentment is strongest. For ali these reasons the degree of intersection betvveen the islamic movements in Iran and Afghanistan has been much less than migbt at first sight have appeared likely.
3. Despite the vveakening of the armed forces in the revolution Iran remains the dominant air and sea povver in the Gulf; the Ir&nian navy vvas the least affected of the three branches of the armed forces. Iranian spokesmeıı have tepeatedly stated that Iran vvill not play a gendarm role in the Gulf aeain, but this does not exclude Iran acting 011 its ovvn behalf: Admiral Madani, the former chief of the navy , stated thathe vvould support Iranian forces crossing the Gulf to fight communism, if this proved necessary. What has changed Iran's Gulf postıue more than anything is hovvever the impact on the Gulf of less official but none the less important tendencies inside Iran vvho have appealed to the memories of a larger Persian domination in the region and vvho at the same time make a cali for an extension of ths islamic revolution. The mostnoticeablc singleincident in this regard vvas the cali by Ayatollah Rouhani for the retuın of Bahrain to Iran-a cali that no government official has eııdor-sed, but vvhich aroused anxiety in the Arab states. What is perhaps more important about Rouhani's statement is that it gives voice to one of the strains in the Iranian revolution, namely Persian nationalism, and this is a theme that is likely to continue to find an echo in Iran and elsevvhere. Ironically, the long-established pan-Iranist groupings inside Iranian politics have not found conditions favourable to them in Iran, because their exalltation of the pıe-Muslim period is in conflict vvith the current Müslim emphasis of the regime. But part of their ideological appeal has been appropriated by the mollahs vvho combine it vvith the cali for further islamic revolution in the region.
4. The cali for a broader islamic revolution İrs at the heart of Khomeini's vvorld vievv; indeed, insofaı as the Ayatollah has a foreign policy, this is it. In his own speecbes, in those cf his subordinates, and in the radio and press of the Islamic republic, this is a recurrent theme. Iran is presented as the centre of a nevv militant international Müslim movement that encompasses such diverse areas as Palestine and Afghanistan, Eritrea and Chad, southern Philippines and Kashmir. The attack upon the Iraqi government is repeatedly phrasec in religious terms-vvith references to the 'nevv Yazics' and 'godless' rulers-and the Saudi Arabian ruling family comes in for similar abase. Such unive,-salism is common to ali revolutions, from the French to the Cuban, and in the Iranian case it is combined vvith an invocation of the universal state vvhich, it is claimed, the Tvvelfth imam vvill tstablish on earth. "This avvaited universal Islamic state vvill', Ahvaz radio stated in Arabic on 1 September, 'Demolish ali tryannical thrones bjilt on the corpses of the oppressed and the svvord of justice vvill claim ali charlatans, agents and traitoıs'. Yet here again an number of difficulties arise. First, the Islamic tone of Iran's nevv foreign policy has created difficulties interı.ally, vvhere the criticisnı is made that Khomeini has "forgotten" about Iran, a country he rarely mentions in his speeches. At the same time, vvhat purports to be a cali for a general Islamic upsurge ıs ali to often seen, and even presented, as an appeal for a Shiite revolution, vvith the result that the Iranian revolution does as much to foster divisions betvveen Muslims as it does to ünite them in a common cause. Thirdly, and most impoıtantly, this Müslim universalism suffers from the problem that has beset ali revclutionary universalism, namely that the conditions vvhich produced one successful revolution are never found in another counay. It may vvell be that Khomeini's attempt to promote Islamic revolution in Arab countries vvill enccunter the same obstacles that the Bolsheviks encountered in Eıırope in the 1920s and the Cubans in Latin Ameıica in the 1960s.
Relations vvith the Majör WoiId Povvers
It is a fact of more than historical or ironic significance that the tvvo countries in vvhich the cold vvar began vvere İran and Poland. The fail of the Shah has effected both jmaor povvers. The impact of Iran's revolution upon the USA falls into tvvo phases-the impact of the revolution itself, i.e. of the period up to February 1979, and the impact of the hostages crisis, i. e. the period since November 1979. The former on its own would have had important poîitical consequences for US foreign policy, given the net loss of America's most active ally in the region, and given the psychological blow which such a debacle would in any event have constituted. Combined vvith the seizure of the hostages, Iran has become the symbol and the instigation of a new look in US foreign policy summarised in the argument that it has released America from 'the Vietnam syndrome'. There vvas already a turnaround in US thinking prior to Iran, a nevv readiness to play an activist role , and subsequent events in Afghanistan have added to this change of mood. Yet it is above ali Iran vvhich, both in its objective consequences for the US posture in the region and in its subjective impact on US public opinion, which has played the greatest single role in this nevv and ominous US approach to world affairs. In essence, the Iranian revolution has provoked four majör changes in US policy, each of vvhich has had consequences for the other states of the region.
1. With the collapse of the Nixon Doctrine structure in the Gulf , the USA has been forced to revise its "security' plans. It has tried to find a nevv ally in Egypt, and is scheduled to seli $ 8-10 billions vvortlı of vveapons to Sedat in the 1980 s. At the same time, its is encouraging another militarily influential Müslim country, namely Pakistan, to assume a greater role in the Gulf, particularly in guaranteeing the Saudi government. A second plank in the nevv US strategy is the preparedness to play a greater direct role vvhen this is needed. Hence the US is building up its Diego Garcia facilities in the Indian Ocean. and has acquıred base facilities in Oman, Somalia and Kenya, as part of a stronger military posture in the region. The planned Rapid Deployment Force, a body of över 100,000 men for possible use in the region, follovvs the same logic.
2. This nevv forevvard strategy in the Middle East would have been impossible vvithout the change of mood in the USA itself to vvhich Iran, and in particular the second 'hostagc' phase has contributed. Whereas in the latter years of the Vietram vvar the US leadership vvas more belligerent than much of public opinion, there is no w a reverse situation, vvith the more outspoken public voices urging military action upon a somevvhat more cautious leadership. In retrospect this enraged new mood in the USA may be the most important international consequence of the Iranian revolution yet it may be other countries, in Central America, oı in the Arab world who vvill pay the most direct price for Iran's policies. It is here, in its effects upon other third world peoples, that the dangers of Iranian conduct över the hostages become most evident.
3. The crisis över the hostages has provoked retaliation from the USA in financial and economic fields, most noticeably in the seizure of Iran's banking assets valued at över $ 8 billions. The consequences of this have not been lost upon other OPEC states, particularly upon the Arab states \vho may in the future fiııd themselves in conflict vvith the USA över Palestine. The US action has indeed hit at the apparent foundationof the vvhole post-1973 recycling system, under which the OPEC states were encouraged to return their surplus by purchases or investment in the developed countries. Nor is it just the policy of the US government vvhich has merited attention: the Chase Manhattan Bank, an institutic.n vvith long and close ties to the Pahlavi court, played a leading role both in having the Shah admitted to the USA and in artificially provoking a situation in vvhich Iran was deemed to have defaulted on ali its loans. The hostages issue tlurefore revealed, quite apart from the particular matter under dispule, just hovv a combination of bankers and government officials in the developed vvorld can launch an assault upon a third vvorld country.
4. Both phases of the crisis in US-Iranian relations have also provoked nevv conflicts betvveen the USA and its allies on one side, and Japan and the Europeans on the other. Such disputes go back a long time, to the early 1950s vvhen the British lost their monopoly on Iranian oil. During the revolution itself the Japanese and French in particular vvere at pains to distance themselves from the Shah vvhilst the British and Americans stood by their aliy almost until the end. In the period foiiovving the seizure of the hostages, hovvever, the public divergences becamc much vvider, and the British, although vocally supporting America, liııed up much more confidently vvith the otlıer Europeans and vvith the Japanese. None of these countries iıuposed serious sanctions upon Iran, or seized Iranian financial assets, or favou-red military action. As vvith the change in the mood vvithin the USA, Iran vvas not the only cause of a rift betvveen the USA and its allıes, but it certainly played a majör role in reinforcing the divergences The Soviet Union has, for its paıt, piayed a much less evident role in the Iranian revolution than has the USA, despite the fact that the revolution occurred in a state along its southern broders. Indeed the Russian policy has been consistently cautious one: the first official Soviet statements on the revolutionary movement vvere made only in November 1978, and since the advent of Khomeini's government to povver Soviet coverage of events inside İran has been spasmodic, if not vvithout some method. In general terms, the fail of the Shah repıcsents a net gain for the USSR vvhich sees a hostile regime removed from its borders. The Russians, vvho are noted for patience in such matters, must be prepared to retain hopes that över a period of years the pro-Soviet leftvving forces in Iran vvill gain ground. In the meantime, given the strength of anti-communist sentiment in Iran and given the sensitive geographical position Iran occupies, it is best for the USSR to play as small a role in Iran as possible, even assuming it is capable of intervening. Hovvever, it is not possible for the Soviet Union merely to ingore Iran: the revolution and its aftermath have posed a numbeı of difficult problems for it.
1. The Soviets cannot easily ignore the fate of their allies inside Iran itself. The authorities in Moscovv have a long tradition of playing dovvn the repression of their friends in situations vvhere such discretion has positive results; Egypt under Nasser vvas one such case and they vvere quite vvilling to collaborate vvith the Shah in his day. But vvith an influential Tudeh Party and other leftvving forces clashing vvith the Muslims, Moscovv's hand may be forced to a greater or lesser extent. So for such criticism has been muted. The Russian press reported favourably on the Kurdish struggle for aııtonomy in September 1979 but did not rcpeat such coverage during later Kurdish-central government clases in 1980. When a prominent commentator Alexander Bovin made a criticism of Khomeini and of "religious fanaticism" in a blunt commentary in September 1979 the Iranians protested and no such statements have subsequently appeared. Such a policy must have its breaking point and a protracted conflict betvveen secular left and Islamic right in Iran vvould probably provoke such a break. So far, the Soviet press has restricted its criticisms to such lesser personahties as Qotbzadeh and BaniSadr, but has avoided, vvhith the exception of Bovin, any direct challenge to Khomeini and the Islamic regime as a vvhole.
2. The hostages issue has highlighted vvhat is the overriding Soviet concern in Iran, namely the desire to prevent a direct US military intervention there. The November 1978 statement by Brezhnev on Iran vvarned the USA against any such move, and coverage of the hostage issue has placed cricicism of US thıe-ats against Iran at the top of the list. The reason for this is not just that the Russians vvant to prevent the USA re-establishing itself in Tran, but rather that the very fact of a US military action against a country on Russia's borders vvould constitute a strategic humiliation, even if it did not permanently alter the political balance inside the country. Just as US officials have manifested considerable alarm at vvhat is in real terms the nugatory Soviet force of 3,000 military personnel on the island of Cuba, so the Russians vvant above ali to avoid a situation in vvhich the forces of their rival are operating in Iran. To a considerable extent this has shaped the Soviet response to the hostage issue itself : vvhilst the Russians have repeatedly stated that they do not support the taking of hostages, they stress that this does not justify the use by the USA of military force.
3. Since the events in Iran and Afghanistan have legitimated a nevv US military posture in the region, the USSR has sought to respond ot vvhat is, from its point of view, a nevv encirclement of its southern frontiers by Washington and its allies. This is especially so because of the difficulties vvhich the Soviets have been experiencing in continuing any serious disarmament negociations vvith the USA. Despite a considerable body of vvestern literatüre on this subject, hovvever, there is little substance to the claims conventionally made that the Russians are trying to seize control of the Gulf, via Iran, Afghanistan or elsevvhere. If anything their actions in Afghanistan have lessened their influence in the Gulf region. They have, hovvever, taken note of the alarm vvhich their recent policies and their energy problems have occasioned and have made repeated offers to the vvest to negotiate on the ques-tion of Gulf security. Their precise terms have not been spelt out, but it would seem that they are keen to stress (a) that they recognise the west as having an economic interest in the region (b) that they are vvilling to negotiate guarantees for the security of international trade in oil.
4. From the Russian point of view the intervention in Afghanistan could not have occurred at a vvorse time as far as its relations with Iran are concerned. This is not so much because of the real asistance which Iran has given to the rebel s, but because of the way in which the Afghanistan issue is being used by the Islamic government in Iran to vilify the Soviet Union and to really international opinion against Soviet support for the Kabul government. In the most immediate terms, it has made it even more difficult to evolve a working relationship vvith the Tehran government than it vvould otherwise have been. The intervention in Afghanistan has led to a certain change in tone in Soviet coverage of Iran: on the one hand, the westerıı response to the intervention has made the Russians even less sympathetic to the American position on the hostages; on the other, Soviet criticism of those Iranians, apart from Khomeini, who oppose the Afghan intervention, has increased. Hence vvhile in one dimension the Afghan intervention might be seen to have lessened the gap betvveen Moscow and Tehran. in other respects it has increased it.
5. The Iranian revolution has had a defmite if limited, impact \vithin the USSR itself. This is so in the economic field, since Iran vvas the USSR's majör Middle Eastern trading partner in the pre-revolutionary period. The cutoff in gas supplies has affected parts of southern Russia, and the Soviet Union has shovvn itself interested in concluding new trading agreements with Iran in order to revive trade and possibly take advantage of any western boycott, vvere this ever to become effective. The poîitical impact of the Iranian revolution inside the USSR has been a matter of more speculation, but less substantive evidence. Whilst one can only assume that the 50 million Musüms of Soviet Central Asia are in some way aware of the revolution in Iran, and vvhilst their demographic and poîitical vveight vvitlıin the USSR is growing , there is very little indication that the events in Iran have found any echo inside the Asian repııblics.
The great majority of Soviet Musliras are Suıınis and therefore to some extent insulated from Iranian examples; their material standard of living is much higher than in Iran-let alone Afghanistan; they do not have the autonomous religious institutions around which such a movement could crystallise; and the increased self-consciousness in these areas seems to have taken as much a national as a religious form, bearing oııt what must be one of the lessoııs of Iran's post-revolutionary experierıce, ııamely that the ethnic divisions within Müslim countries can prevail as divisive factor över the supposedly unifying appeals of religion. Perhaps the best indication ofthelimited appeal of the Iranian events to Soviet Muslims is given by coııtrasting the impact of the Iranian revolution with the events in Poland. The latter have posed the possibility of having a direct demoııstration effect on sectors of Soviet society; the former appear, by contrast, to have found as yet little resonance.
The greatest Soviet concern about Iran is, therefore, that it should become the occasion for an international confrontation vvith the USA, and it is this vvhich determines the overall pattern of Soviet policy. The next most important concern is probably the desire to prevent policies pursued in Iran from having an impact on the Afghan issue, either directly, through aid to the rebels, or indirectly, through the mobilisation of Islamic opinion. In the longer run, hovvever, there vvould appear to be every likelihood of some greater divergence and eventually conflict betvveen the Islamic movement in Iran and the Soviet Union because of the divergent political and ideological characteristics of the tvvo entities in question. The ultimate philosophical divergences need little exposition here, but vvhat seems likely ın the intermediary period is of a desire, at least on the Russian side, to avoid a head -on conflict vvhilst husbanding the resources of the left in İran. İn a curious vvay the tvvo vvork through their conflict by trying to dravv the other on to its cbosen urrain: the Islamic movement cffers a sense of spirit and cultural identity to the Iranian populatioıı, and to a greater or lesser extent ııeglects the material concerns of evervday life. The pro-Soviet forces cannot, despite some attempts, compete in the realm of the spiritual and cultural, but do offer a programme that vvill tackle the problems of the economy and of Iranian society. In the first flush of post -revolutionary enthusiasm it would seertı to be the spiritual vvhich prevails över the material; how long this can last remains to be seen. Part of the non-aligned perspective of the islamic government has been its emphasis upon the rcjection of both "east' and "west' and the vvillingness to criticise vvhat is seen as the "satanic" character of Soviet policy över such issues as Afghanistan. Hence whilst the history of US ties to the Shah, and the subsequent crisis över the hostages have provoked the sharpest disagreement in relations between Tehran and Washington, there are other factors which may at some point in the future lead to seroius problems in relations vvith the USSR. In neither basic philosophy nor regional politics is there any more long-run convergence betvveen the Iranian revolution and the Soviet Union, than there is betvveen Iran and the USA. What may certainly force Iran to choose is a situation in vvhich it faces a direct conflict vvith one or other majör povver and thereby needs the support of the cther. it is therefore vvorthvvhile to examine, m some detail, the various situations under vvhich the islamic revolution in Iran itself could be the occasion for a broader regional or international conflict.
Possible Conflict Situations: Regional and International
Given the various official and unofficial pressures operating vvithin Iran, events inside that country could become the occasion for vvideı conflagrations in a number of vvays. The follovving is an exploratory summary cf such situations:
1. Iran could find itself at vvar vvith neighborumg stesta över disputed territory: the Iranians might press their claim to Bahrain, or find themselves at the receiving end of an Arab attempt to regain the three islands in the Gulf seized by the Shah in 1971. Since Iraq has novv renounced the 1975 agıeement on dividing the Shatt al-Arab vvaters. this could be a further issue of conflict. Such a deüberate form of conflict is, on present shovving, not probable: vvhilst disputes on boundary divisions have arisen and could from part of a wider conflict, they are unlikely in themselves to be the occasion for such a conflict. The Iranian claim to Bahrain vvas a minority, unrepresentative one, vvhich no subsequent official statement has endorsed; Arab insistence on the return of the three islands seems to vary with the degree of overall conflict vvith Iran.
2. Iran could find itself at vvar vvith its neighbours as a result of Iranian support for rebel movements inside these other countries: this could apply to support for rebels in Afghanistan, for resisters in Iraq, or even to oppositions forces in Saudi Arabia or smaller Gulf states. So far, as noted, Iranian support for such tendencies has been more rhetorical than substantive but a protracted insurectionary or civil vvar situation in a neighbouring state might dravv Iran in, especially if the Iranian government then in place felt that (a) it could be reasonably sure of prevailing in such a situation and (b) such an initiative appeared likely to command political assent vvithin Iran itself.
3. The opposite eventuality could also occur. as outside countries vvere dravvn into a civil vvar situation in Iran. Present circumstances inside Iran are such that the possibility of a relatively protracted civil vvar, vvith multiple regional as vvell as left / right dimensions, cannot be excluded. In such a situation the impat of such a vvar vvould be felt throughout the region. The Arab states might be under some compulsion to intervene to assist or protect the Arab minority in Khuzistan. This vvould be an intervention along straigh forvvard ethnic lines. Other states, Arap and non-Arab, might try to play oa role by encouraging forces vvhom they thought vvould displace a Khomeini-type regime and replace it by one more or less sypmathetic to them: certainly, any serious civil vvar in Iran vvould open the door for various kinds of restorationist initiatives in vvhich some Iranian exiles vvould play a part. Finally, there is the possibility that the majör vvorld povvers vvould be dravvn into a civil vvar, in support of their respective clients. The main factor militating against this is the sensitive strategic location of Iran, such that evident action by one side vvould provoke comparable reaction on the other side. But this same factor, Iran's strategic importance, vvould also increase the pressure on the Americans or Russians to play a role.
4. What makes a great povver role more likely is direct confrontation betvveen one or other of these and Iran. At the moment, the most likely such conflict involves American action to liberate the hostages, or to inflict compensatory damage on Iran.
Such a situation would necessarily involve the risk of a Soviet response, either in response to Iranian requests for aid, or in order to assert Russia's strategic interest in the region. Both the USA and the USSR have so far tried to avoid this: the desire not to provoke the Russians has been one factor restraining Washington, and the Russians never responded to an Iranian request for help to prevent their harbours being mined by the US fleet. But there can be no certainty that the majör povvers will not be involved as long as the hostages dispute continues.
5. Considerable attention has been given in the vvestern press, since Afghanistan, to the possibility of a Soviet-Iranian clash, either thruough a spillover of the conflict in Afghanistan, or through a direct Soviet offensive through a weakened Iran to the Gulf oilfields and warm vvaters. Technically, such an operation would present little difficulty to the Soviet forces vvho could presumably control the main ocmmunications of Iran in a matter of a few days. Politically, hovvever, such an eventuality seems highly unrealistic, and no less so since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The Iranians have not shovvn much enthusiasm for an outright clash vvith the USSR: neither their territorial claims, on the Caucasian provinces taken by Russia in the early nineteenth century, nor their appeals to 'oppressed Muslims' in Soviet Central Asia, have been very sustained. The Russians too can distinguish betvveen a situation in vvhich a proSoviet Afghan government is being supported, in a country that is of marginal importance to the west , and a situation in vvhich the Red Army invades a country that is deemed vital to US strategic inteıests. Rather than a Soviet intervention in Iran leading to a US-Soviet confrontation as some post -Afghanistan speculation has seen it, it is more likely that the Soviet Union vvould only cross the Iranian frontiers once such an overall USSoviet clash, i. e. World War III, had already begun. The reasons vvhich led Stalin to vvithdravv his forces from Azerbaijan in 1946, and Lenin to pull his out of Gilan in 1921, stili command Soviet strategy tovvards Iran to-day.
6. Given its naval and air capabilities, Iran stili possesses the ability to inflict serious damage upon the oil routes in and outside the Gulf, as vvell as at the Straits of Hormuz. Such an operation could result from local disputes or be part of a vvider
